Grenfell Tower Inquiry Blames Manufacturers and Architects, Among Others
John Hill
5. 9月 2024
Grenfell Tower fire, 4:43 am on June 14, 2017 (Photo: Natalie Oxford/Twitter, via Wikimedia Commons)
Seven years after 72 people were killed in a fire that, due to highly flammable facade retrofit, quickly spread through the 24-story Grenfell Tower public housing block in West London, a public inquiry puts the manufacturer of the cladding and the tower's renovation architect, among others, at fault.
The results of the public inquiry were released this week in a nearly 1,700-page report that has been summarized at many news outlets, including the BBC and the New York Times. The former says, for instance, that the fire “was the result of a chain of failures by governments, ‘dishonest’ companies and a lack of strategy by the fire service […] The damning report sets out a ‘path to disaster’ at Grenfell stretching back to the early 1990s over how fire safety in high-rise buildings has been managed and regulated.”
Although the report, summarized here, puts blame on many parties — the Conservative government, building management, and the London Fire Brigade, to name just a few — Arconic, the manufacturer of the composite aluminum rainscreen cladding that was used on the building refurbishment, was “by far the largest contributor,” per experts in the inquiry. “Arconic deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger of using Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form, particularly on high-rise buildings,” the summary says.
The retrofit of the 1972 tower, which included a new facade over the concrete structure, was completed in the middle of 2016 and was carried out by the architects at the now-defunct Studio E. Although Studio E did not have high-rise experience, it was hired for the project in 2012, when it was designing a school at the base of the tower. The architects initially selected a zinc cladding but primarily cost factors led them to switch to the Reynobond 55 PE, a combustible product. They also selected a combustible insulation made by Celotex for the cladding, leading the inquiry to assert that “Studio E demonstrated a cavalier attitude to the regulations affecting fire safety,” and “The risks of using combustible materials in the external walls of high-rise buildings were well known and they should have been aware of them.”
“Part of Grenfell Tower, after the tragic fire, as seen from near Notting Hill Methodist Church, London. June 16, 2017.” (Photo: ChiralJon/Flickr, via Wikimedia Commons)
In a section of the public inquiry specifically related to the role of the architects in the Grenfell Tower fire, the executive summary says, in part:
“Traditionally, the role of the architect has been fundamental to any construction project of significant size. Regrettably, the work of Studio E on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment fell significantly below the standard reasonably to be expected of it in a number of significant ways, in particular, in failing to exercise proper care in relation to the choice of insulation and rainscreen panels. The evidence, not least the fact that similar materials have since been found on hundreds of other high-rise buildings, suggests that there may be a widespread failure among the profession to investigate properly or understand the nature of the materials being chosen for that purpose.
“We recognize that both the Architects Registration Board and the Royal Institute of British Architects have taken steps since the Grenfell Tower fire to improve the education and training of architects. We recommend that they should review the changes already made to ensure they are sufficient in the light of our findings.”
“Grenfell Tower with banners at the top with heart symbol and the wording ‘Grenfell Forever In Our Hearts’ in June 2018. The topping out of the protective sheeting and scaffolding took place in time for the 1-year anniversary of the Grenfell Tower Fire.” (Photo: Carcharoth/Wikimedia Commons)
Following the release of the report, RIBA issued a statement by Chair of Board Jack Pringle that says, in part:
“The failures which led to the fire were system-wide, with myriad contributing factors in the years preceding, on the morning of, and in the aftermath of the tragedy.
“The report makes clear that people’s safety requires reform of structures and regulations. This includes systemic change within the construction industry, and a fundamental shift in culture and behaviors. This is a collaborative endeavor and RIBA has committed to playing a leading role.
“As the Inquiry also notes, RIBA has taken steps since June 2017 to improve education and training in our profession. With the benefit of these comprehensive findings, and as recommended, we will review the measures already introduced.
“Many of the report’s insights and recommendations, particularly on the role and responsibilities of an architect, have great relevance for our members. We will take time to study them in detail, update our members, and continue to play an active role in the creation of a safer built environment.”